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Resumen: En el siglo XIX la sociedad española comenzaba a integrarse, muy re-
zagada y con sus particularidades socio-culturales, entre las sociedades de la 
modernidad occidental capitalista. Con sus diferencias y su “ser tradicional”, 
no podía permanecer ajena por más tiempo a un nuevo orden de configuración 
paradigmática de la realidad que, a su vez, per-formaba el orden de las cosas, 
los hechos y las categorías. De hecho, bien entrado el siglo XIX aún no se había 
embarcado con plenitud en los procesos de la modernidad occidental (secula-
rización y democratización), porque tampoco podía asumir la ruptura con los 
valores culturales más enraizados, de sus costumbres y sus fueros medievales. 
El papel de la ciencia jurídica, especialmente a través de la escuela krausista, 
fue decisivo para el reformismo que la sociedad española necesitaba.
Abstract: The truth is that 19th Century Spanish society began to integrate 
– with its unique socio-cultural particularities and somewhat later than other
countries – into what we might call the world system of Western capitalist
modernity, to the extent that it could – and indeed did – create the conditions
for governing its own reproduction. Spanish society, with its differences and its
“traditional way of being,” could not remain oblivious for any longer to a new
order, a paradigmatic configuration of reality that, in turn, shaped the order of
things, events, and categories. Indeed, well into the 19th Century, Spain had
not yet embarked fully on the processes of Western modernity (secularisation
and democratisation). The role modern legal science has carried out a crucial
part in the Spanish contemporary history. It was essential in the arrival to
Spain of the process of the Age of Enlightenment, linked to the principles of
secularization and democratization.
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1. Introduction
Krause’s work first became known in 
Spain through one of his most famous 
disciples, Heinrich Ahrens, who, in 1838, 
was claimed to have written one of the 
most precise syntheses of his master’s 
legal philosophy: Cours de droit naturel 
ou de philosophie du droit, translated into 
Spanish in 1841, by professors Eusebio 
María del Valle and Ruperto Navarro 
Zamorano, a translation that was known 
to Sanz del Río, the genuine precursor of 
Krausism in Spain1. 
Let us begin by noting that the concern 
for law expressed within Spanish 
Krausism became evident from its earliest 
codes. Naturally, the most pressing 
question, therefore, is why the opus of 
the most neglected of German classical 
philosophers, through the work of Julián 
Sanz del Río, achieved such widespread 
acceptance in Spain? Why was it able to 
spread –especially through Francisco 
Giner de los Ríos– so quickly, to influence 
and remain influential for so long (even 
1. Julián Sanz del Río, a Doctor of Law and Ac-
ting Professor of the History of Philosophy, left
Spain in 1843, commissioned by the Government
to ascertain and import doctrines and knowledge
useful to the social and political transformation
that our country needed in the 19th century. He
headed to Germany, impressed by the reading of
Ahrens’ work, –two years previously he had ad-
vised the government to replace the subjects of
Natural Law, the Principles of universal legisla-
tion and the Principles of public law with a Philo-
sophy of Law fellowship– fascinated by Ahrens
himself and somewhat urged on by Victor Cou-
sin. In Heidelberg, he made contact with Krausist
authors (Karl Röder, Herman Leonhardi, etc.)
and from that moment onwards devoted himself
to spreading the teachings of Krause through his
Fellowship in the Amplification of Philosophy,
awarded to him in 1856.
after the disappearance of the ‘Krausist 
School’) to the extent of revolutionising 
the institutional functioning of State 
structures? This was especially true in 
the field of education; indeed the Free 
Institute of Education is a good example 
of this. The trail left behind by Krause “was 
not erased in Spain as Hegelianism was, 
leaving no trace other than certain socialist 
derivations. Its vitality left such a deep 
mark that, even after the individuality of 
the school had disappeared, its doctrines, 
now without seal or origin, blended into 
the circulatory torrent of general thought, 
encouraging explanations, books and 
conferences, dominating the sphere of 
law, and sending from his tomb a parting 
beam of light, as if linked to human 
consciousness by an irradiation that can 
never disappear”2. 
It should be stressed, however, there was 
no ‘Krausist School’ in the strict sense of the 
term. Although for a long time, there were 
several generations of intellectuals open to 
its numerous legal, sociological, scientific, 
and anthropological implications, whose 
interventions in public and academic life 
in those years were brimming with the 
democratic-liberal transformation needed 
by political institutions, the secularisation 
of Spanish reality, and the consolidation of 
scientific instruments as a mechanism for 
human emancipation and progress. Use 
of the term ‘generations’ is certainly no 
exaggeration. Following the chronological 
criterion established by Prof. Elias Díaz, 
we could even talk about ‘classes’: The 
first ‘class’ or generation would include, 
among others, Valeriano Fernández 
Ferraz, Federico de Castro, Francisco 
2. Méndez Bejarano, M., Historia de la Filosofía
en España, s.f., p. 466, in Abellan, J.L.., Historia
Crítica del pensamiento español, Barcelona, Cír-
culo de Lectores, 1993, p. 511
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de Paula Canalejas, Vicente Romero and 
Girón, etc., all born between 1832 and 
1835; the second would consist of eminent 
disciples such as Nicolas Salmeron, 
Francisco Giner de los Ríos, Segismundo 
de Azcarate, Juan Uña, etc., all born 
between the years 1838 and 1842; and 
finally, the third ‘class’, the last generation 
of Sanz del Río’s direct disciples, would 
encompass Urbano González Serrano, 
Manuel Sales y Ferré, and José de Case 
y Blanco, among many others. They were 
all born around the middle of the century, 
between 1845 and 18503.
Alongside other interpretations, such as 
those of Manuel de Rivacoba4, which 
emphasise the mythical-spiritual and/
or religious affinity that Spain’s religious 
tradition found in the rational metaphysics 
of Krause, Elías Díaz makes the case in 
even more precise terms: “In my opinion, 
the main reasons for Krause’s prevalence 
in Spain are rooted –in addition to their 
concurrence with certain historical features 
of the national temperament, psychology 
and culture – in the fact that his philosophy 
resonates more deeply with the political-
cultural ideas of certain (…) sectors of 
Spain’s progressive liberal bourgeoisie in 
the second half of the last century: ideas 
expressed formally and coherently by 
this group of Krausist intellectuals and 
institutionalists who, even though they 
were from that social class, were able 
to synthesise their ideological, political 
(driven by a genuine push for freedom), 
and material aspirations (making the 
case for socio-economic order based on 
private ownership compatible with that 
freedom). Without such concordance, the 
3. V. Díaz, E., La Filosofía social del krausismo
español, Madrid, Edicusa, 1973, pp. 180-184.
4. V. Rivacoba, M., Krausismo y Derecho, Santa
Fe, Ed. Castellví, 1963, pp. 19- 20.
way in which this philosophy took hold 
throughout Spain would be inexplicable. It 
is not, therefore, merely or mainly because 
it coincided with an immutable traditional 
way of being in Spain, characterised 
in somewhat abstract, a-historical and 
timeless terms. The concordance was 
more specific and temporal, responding 
to the world view held at the time and to 
all kinds of interests (economic, cultural, 
etc.), which were characteristic of this 
Spanish liberal progressive bourgeoisie in 
the second half of the last century, whose 
help would prove decisive”5 
2. Why was Spanish liberal
reformism so important?
Regardless of any concordance or 
resonance, the truth is that 19th Century 
Spanish society began to integrate –with 
its unique socio-cultural particularities 
and somewhat later than other countries– 
into what we might call the world system 
of Western capitalist modernity, to 
paraphrase Wallerstein6 (world empires/
world economies), to the extent that it could 
–and indeed did– create the conditions
for governing its own reproduction.
Spanish society, with its differences and its
“traditional way of being,” could not remain
oblivious for any longer to a new order, a
paradigmatic configuration of reality that,
in turn, shaped the order of things, events,
and categories.
Indeed, well into the 19th Century, Spain 
had not yet embarked fully on the processes 
of Western modernity (secularisation and 
5. Díaz, E., La filosofía social del Krausismo es-
pañol, Op. cit., pp. 26 y 27. V. also p.37.
6. V. Wallerstein, I., El moderno sistema mun-
dial, Madrid, s. XXI, 1979.
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democratisation). But, it could also not 
break away fully from its most deeply 
rooted cultural values, customs and 
medieval laws: 
(i) because there was major resistance and
resentment in Spain to the philosophy of
the Enlightenment and the processes of
modernity. These sentiments were rooted
in the second half of the 18th century and
grew stronger following the triumph of
the French Revolution7. From that point
onwards, they became the cause of schism
and clashes –which turned into fratricide
during the 19th Century– between suppor-
ters of the different Spanish traditions (the
old) –who called themselves “rancios”
(ancient/established) and “casticistas”
(purist)– and advocates of the ideals of
Enlightenment and Encyclopaedism (the
new), that is, of the modernisation of
Spain. Resistance that embodied a much
more complex and profound struggle than
the mere conservation of Spanish laws or
respect for its traditions. It was a struggle
for power, and tradition provided the
pretext that the classes linked to the Old
Regime needed for a national and religious
crusade in defence of their old interests
and prerogatives. It was, quite simply,
“the entrenchment of a society of blind
immobilism that rebuffs even the slightest
attempts to reform, the smallest change
and any suggestion that verges on even
the most elementary rationality.”8 To do so
questioned their privileges and destroyed
7. V. the exponents of reactionary thougt on
the time: Fernando de Zeballos (1732-1802),
Fernández Valcarce (1723-1798) o Antonio José
Rodríguez (1703-1778), primero; y, después,
a Antonio Javier Pérez López (1736-1792) o
Antonio Vila y Camps (1747-1809), etc ; all of
them clergymen o jurists .
8. Abellan, J.L., Historia crítica del Pensamiento
Español, Madrid, Círculo de Lectores, 1993, Vol. 
5, p. 199.
their expectations regarding the regulation 
of social order. 
(ii) because the exaltation of traditional
values, with their roots and their customary
laws, was already a constant, since their
re-discovery at the hands of reactionary
romanticism in a time of counter-revolution
and traditionalism. Against the claims of
universality, abstraction, homogeneity,
that is, in the face of the transformations
that the scientific paradigm effected
on life, language and the socio-legal
mode of being, these Spanish romantics
championed the national, the religious, the
local and the concrete. Against the progress 
of particular sciences, natural history,
grammar and economics, the romantics
brandished emotions, traditional values,
language and social criticism. However,
against this traditionalist romanticism
there was another liberal and progressive
romanticism, concerned with tradition but
open to the reforms so desperately needed
by Spanish society and culture. Progressive
Spanish romanticism, especially literary
romanticism, provided a spillway for
tradition in the face of expectations of
historical transformation brought into
play by Western modernity. It was the
cornerstone to the permanence of “Spain’s
traditional way of being”. The cultural rift
that modernity inflicted on the old traditions
of medieval customary laws could thus
be neutralised, adapting tradition to new
changes. The romantics recovered the old,
made memories of the past, which they
merged with the new, enabling cultural
recovery within a socio-cultural context of
profound renewal. One might say it acted
as a bridge between traditio and novum.
Spanish Krausism coexisted - albeit
with certain differences - alongside this
(liberal) form of romanticism. They both
promoted “Spain’s re-encounter with itself
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as a modern nation”9. This progressive 
romanticism thus became a decisive and 
inseparable movement from Krausism 
as it took its first steps. “The profound 
renewal -in a liberal and more modern 
sense that affects the vision of man- of the 
world, of life, of history, of society and of 
the problem of Spain, was being prepared 
at the time through Sanz del Río’s trip to 
Germany, where he drank deeply from the 
very sources of romantic philosophy, from 
which Krausism would emerge, along with 
the distressed, lyrical and metaphysical 
subjectivism of the generation of 98” 10. 
(iii) And because modern secularisation
had failed to desacralise Spanish reality,
too imbued, to paraphrase Eloy Terrón,
with an anachronistic and arbitrary social
order in which the crudest superstition was 
entrenched11. The socio-cultural confi-
guration of Spain, inscribed with some
variants in what we might call Western
capitalist modernity, was still articulated
in the middle of the 19th Century around
a sequence that sacralised reality12. This
9. Ibid., p. 345
10. Del Río A., Historia de la Literatura españo-
la, Nueva York, 1963, p. 108, en Abellan, Op.cit.,
p. 346. See, also a Marichal, J., “La melancolía
del liberal español: de Larra a Unamuno”, in La
Torre, Vol. IX, 1961 o a Kirkpatrick, S., Larra:
el laberinto inextricable de un romántico liberal,
Madrid, Gredos, 1977.
11. Terron, E., “Estudio Preliminar a J. Sanz del
Río”, in Sanz del Río Textos escogidos, Barce-
lona, Ediciones Cultura Popular, 1969, p. 61.
12. The processes of sacralisation entailed a frag-
mentary differentiation (or differentiating frag-
mentation) of reality (sacred-profane), always
in alignment with basic empirical knowledge
that perceives the world through dualities. The
passage towards absolutisation is brought about
through the substantialisation of those fragments
inscribed within an oppositional logic (metaphy-
sical oppositionalism that they all identify with
the dualist separation between good and bad:
would explain how Krausism with its 
“rational metaphysics,” especially linked 
to the sphere of law, flourished in the 
liberal circles of a decidedly progressive, 
but also intimist and religious incipient 
social class, rather disinclined towards 
a secularisation of reality that was more 
than skin-deep13. One could say that, in 
Krause’s work, law was the very axis of the 
entire system. It was, to paraphrase Elías 
Díaz, a project of “rational iusnaturalism 
that sought to welcome the historical and 
positive elements of law.” 14 Hence, law 
heaven and hell, etc.). Insofar as the fragments 
are imbued with value/worth, they are ordered in 
accordance with value tables (for example, dua-
lists or binary), and they are categorised as sacred 
or profane. However, at this time in which each 
partial thing (fragment) is endowed with subs-
tantivity, the worth we assign to them becomes 
absolute. In this regard, we are talking about ab-
solute values that are opposed. 
13. “To say, as is so often said today, that since
the Renaissance, our ‘Western’ societies have
become desacralised, is still a commonplace that
in other respects encompasses a genuine error.
It is a sacralised society that is founded on an
absolute value, external and superior to the will of
all the individuals who constitute it. (...) After the
Renaissance, due to the development of trade and
subsequently of industry, all aspects of human life
-economic, political, intellectual and even moral- 
gained independence from the previous world view. 
In other words, our society became secularised,
and religion was reduced to a “private matter.”
But it was not completely desacralised, because it
remained subject to an absolute purpose that was
external and superior to the will of the individuals
who made up that society, even if that purpose had
no religious sense, the success of enterprises (both
individual and collective) appears as self-fulfilling
purpose” (Garaudy, R. , La Alternativa (original
title L’Alternative, Robert Laffont, Paris, 1972,
trans. by José Ma. De Llanos and Gregorio Fíjos-
Barba), Edicusa, Madrid, 1973, pp. 64-65 
14. Díaz, E., “Filosofía jurídico-política del
Krauso-institucionismo español”, in Derechos y
Libertades, nº 12 (2003), p. 29.
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was the path followed in the development 
of his metaphysics. That is why Antonio 
Jiménez García writes: “The last chapter 
of the practical consequences of Krause’s 
system refers to policies and is linked 
to the sphere of law, a field of patent 
originality, which many authors have been 
quick to heap praise upon, even those 
who criticise Krause in other areas of 
knowledge”15
Therefore, the stoic perception of reality, 
the intimism and mysticism of the Krausist 
philosophy found immensely fertile soil in 
the Spanish imaginary, because of the 
firm root Erasmus’ ideas had taken hold 
among Spanish intellectuals during the 
Renaissance16. There was no place for 
any other philosophy, bearing in mind the 
political-social conditions of the time17. 
15. Jiménez, A., “Apuntes sobre el sistema fi-
losófico de Krause (1781-1832)”, in Revista de
Filosofía, July December, 1982, p. 219.
16. See Joaquín Xirau on this point: “Earthly 
humanity constituted by the organism of all its
circles – in the family, in nations, in peoples,
in friendship, in social trade, in the state, in the
church, and in all the partial societies that make
up the human race – is but a part of the universal
humanity that constitutes the kingdom of God (…)
The human community forms an organic whole
with the image of the divine Being (…) Its highest
and fullest expression is the human organism, that
is, the organic personality of man. This intimist,
radiant conception, concomitant on so many points
with those of 17th Century humanists , bestows upon 
the figure of Sanz del Río and his circle a courageous 
and joyful vision of the realities of the world and
life” Manuel B. Cossío y la educación en España,
México, 1945, p.19, in Abellan, J. L., Historia
crítica del pensamiento español, Op. cit., p.474.
17. As Eloy Terrón rightly points out, “its appearance 
was determined by the structural changes that
occurred in Spanish society after the reign of
Charles III, accentuated by the great upheaval of
the War of Independence and consummated during
the Civil War.” Terron, E., Sociedad e ideología
In any case, in retrospect, we can 
assume that the Age of Enlightenment 
and European philosophy eventually took 
hold in Spain, albeit it later (towards the 
end of the 19th and beginning of the 
20th Century) in a context that was still 
dominated by the structures of religious 
power. And they did so thanks to the 
work of Krausists and institutionalists, 
concerned particularly to spread the 
ideals of reason and adapt Spanish 
society to the socio-cultural configuration 
of Western capitalist modernity. Krausist-
institutionalism “is an important (late 
but successful) attempt to receive the 
scientific and philosophical proposals of 
European Enlightenment, including its 
legal philosophy, specifically here through 
the connection with the German rationalist/
idealist philosophy of Kant and Hegel, as 
well as Fichte and Schelleing, albeit it with 
K. Ch. F. Krause by way of the main pretext
and synthesis”18.
This might have been predicable of any 
other socio-cultural traditions, with their 
internal dialectics and relations. However, 
within the specific context of the late birth of 
modernity in Spain, here the processes of 
modernity were commanded, as in the rest 
of Europe, by a specific socio-economic 
order (the bourgeois) in pursuit of political 
power and seeking to lay the foundations of 
capitalist development through the socio-
legal transformation of the existing order, 
but, and herein lies the nuance, without 
expeditiously derailing the traditional laws 
and customs of Spanish society. 
The new order that the Spanish liberal 
bourgeoisie intended to establish necessa-
rily involved the creation of a new type 
en los orígenes de la España Contemporánea, Ed. 
Peninsular, Barcelona, 1969, p. 10.
18. Díaz, E., “Filosofía Jurídico-Política del
Krauso-institucionismo español”, Op. Cit., p. 32.
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of society, which basically required two 
agreements: (a) one on science and (b) 
the other on conduct within a legal order19. 
Hence, on the one hand, the (legal) 
conditions that would facilitate their socio-
economic reproduction were strengthened 
and, on the other, the political design 
of new power relations was concealed 
through the adoption of (bourgeois) 
reason, abstract and universalisable, as a 
principle that definitively relocates man in 
history20. However, the internal structures 
were not radically bound in an absolute 
(sacred) way of perceiving reality. Despite 
their clashes with scholasticism and 
traditionalism and the looming threats of 
secularisation, they failed to desacralise 
Spanish reality, unable to alleviate the 
burden of tradition on the culture and 
institutions of our country. 
This was, ultimately, what it was all 
about. To serve the new social order (the 
bourgeoisie), but without completely 
19. Note the tenor of the words spoken by Sanz del 
Río himself in the inaugural address of the 1857-
1858 academic year at Central University: “(…)
when education meets with law in an intelligent,
active, rival cooperation, in the fulfilment of
its intellectual mission, of the legislative and
governmental mission accomplished so far (…)”
Sanz del Río, J., “Speech delivered at the opening
of the academic year 1857-1858 at Central
University”, In Textos Excogidos, Op. Cit.
20. Whatever the spaces explored, they are
quickly conquered and subjected to the canons of
reason. Understanding the history and explanation 
of the universe is now considered res cogitans.
Reason is now the only rule worthy of man. For
Sanz del Río, man (in the Ideal for humanity)
is no more than an idea, “a living image of God
(….) in progressive perfection”, who, in his own 
finiteness “must realize the harmony of universal 
life”. This was the view contained in his writings 
at least. Krause, K.Ch., El ideal de la humanidad 
para la vida, Madrid, 1871, p. 33, in Abellan, J.L., 
Op. cit., p. 471. 
burying the old, naturalising its new 
normative conceptions about justice and 
humanity, through reason and law, in order 
to muffle what was, undoubtedly, a fierce 
battle to become a part of history. Thus, 
through science, the social contract, and 
the legal phenomenon, Spanish society 
was led to understand, through its roots 
and its enduring national culture, that it 
was moving towards new degrees of peace 
and coexistence, towards “the ultimate 
destiny of man and humanity”21, that is to 
say towards political happiness. Moreover, 
the pursuit of “common happiness” was 
made conditional exclusively as a political 
goal, seeking recognition (although not for 
all subjects of course) of the rights that the 
new bourgeois order needed to function 
(natural, inalienable and sacred rights22), 
and to ensure the adoption of rationalism 
as an ideology. Happiness, like freedom, 
was the product of reason. So anyone 
who did not believe in them as a political 
objective was simply considered the 
enemy of reason. This is not surprising 
given that, in the background, under the 
nominal, political –and even literary23– 
21. Jiménez, A., “Apuntes sobre el sistema fi-
losófico de Krause (1781-1832)”, in Revista de
Filosofía, Op. cit., p. 219. See also Sanz del Río,
J., “Discurso pronunciado en la inauguración
del año académico 1857-1858 en la Universidad
Central”, en Textos escogidos, Op. cit., p. 223
22. V. Gauthier, F., Triomphe et mort du droit
naturel en Révolution, 1789, 1795, 1802, PUF,
Paris, 1992
23. Larra’s case is the most significant. “If
romanticism is freedom, and it undoubtedly is,
substantially, Larra is the most romantic of all”.
“In all Spanish romanticism there is no more
forceful proclamation of individual freedom
than the utterances of Macias (one of his most
tragic dramas)” (Alborg, J.L., Historia de la
literatura española. El romanticismo. Volume IV,
Gredos, Madrid, 1980, p. 216 and 274. Authors’ 
parenthesis). In his essay entitled Literatura, Larra 
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search for freedom, efforts were geared 
towards the necessary transformation 
of institutions and relations of social 
production/reproduction, in order to shore 
up the legal foundations of bourgeois 
liberalism: individual freedom, security, 
private property, contract enforcement 
and, only at first, resistance to oppression. 
We could, therefore, say that the 
Krausist-Institutionalist model of society 
was sustained, as was the ideology of 
the bourgeois middle classes of more 
advanced European countries, thanks to: 
(i) a new conception of rationality. From
Galileo and Descartes, with their respective
contributions to the fields of physics and
epistemology, to the philosophy of Kant, a
commitment to rationality was forged, which 
culminated with the adoption of reason as
a universal ordering principle, correcting
the chaos of irrational societies, controlling
nature and explaining phenomena through
the principle of causality. It was without
a doubt a society of intelligences. Sanz
del Río himself called his philosophy
“rational realism.” And his confidence in
reason, in science and in the search for
knowledge took root firmly “through the
strong influence of Giner of Los Ríos and
his disciples through the Free Institute of
Education, in the generation of 1914, and
the republican generation of 1931”24.
(ii) the replacement of the ontological
social bond (Aristotle’s zoon politikon) with
a social bond instituted as the absolute
foundation of the framework for modernity,
writes: “Freedom in literature, as in the arts, as 
in industry, as in commerce, as in consciousness. 
Here is the currency of the time, here is the 
sample, here is the yardstick with which we shall 
measure”. Abellan J.L, Op. cit., p. 316. 
24. Díaz, E., “Filosofía jurídico-política del krau-
so-institucionismo español”, Op. Cit., p. 44.
represented especially in the “individual” 
as a rational and dissociated (legal) 
subject, but, also –and here, another of the 
nuances that differentiate his philosophy 
from individualistic liberalism– within 
intermediate “groups” and “societies.” Let 
us not forget that Krausism-Institutionalism 
was a doctrine that had an organic vision of 
society - the social organism is the reflection 
of human nature. As Prof. Lacambra states, 
“organic liberalism has been as authentic 
an ideological and intellectual reality as 
individualistic, materialistic liberalism.”25 
The development of technologies -by virtue of 
their perfectible nature-, the positivist ideology 
of the sciences, and the fact that the social 
sciences lacked their own epistemological 
status gradually encouraged, in accordance 
with the prevailing mechanistic principles, a 
conception of the human being and of society 
as biological subjects of perfect functioning, 
comparable to that of a machine26. Howe-
ver, although an organic nature is the 
25. (Legaz, L., “El pensamiento social de Gum-
ersindo de Azcárate”, en Estudios de Historia
social en España, Madrid, C.S.I.C, 1960, Vol. I,
p. 28). The teacher Elías Diaz also defines it that
way (Diaz, E., La filosofía social del krausismo
español, op.cit., p. 239).
26. This reductionist view of the human being
was certainly not new. The subject had been
undergoing these kinds of processes since the
Renaissance. It was initially reduced to its strictly
natural dimension. Already in the 17th Century,
the process of rationalisation was brought into
play (ego cogitans). Secularisation did the rest.
Materialistic and/or positivist reductionism was
introduced, either by economic (Marx), historical
or sociological (Comte) or psychoanalytical
(Freud) factors. According to the (scientific) creed,
life could be understood in a bio-sociological way
and in accordance with its physical-chemical
conditions, not to mention representing the State
as a person (Hobbes) or as a machine (Weber), that
is, as a mechanism of perfect functioning. Social
sciences, law, on the other hand, lacked their
own epistemological status. They were therefore
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characteristic of liberals inspired by Krause’s 
philosophy, the truth is that their organicism 
was not biological, but rather spiritualistic. 
Among other reasons because they were 
humanists. The individual remained the 
crucial centre of reality. Krausist philosophy, 
especially that professed by Giner de los 
Ríos and Gumersindo de Azcárate –thinking 
specifically of some of their works such as 
La persona social. Estudios y fragmentos 
(1899) and Estudios económicos y sociales 
(1876), respectively– , was a response to 
this socio-biological organicism, which was 
widespread in the 19th century. In short, 
his radical liberalism was not individualistic 
(materialist), but rather democratic and 
organicist (not biological, but “ethical-
spiritual”). 
(iii) the assumption of the Enlightened idea
of a nation, not as a romantic or historicist
concept, but as an idealistic and anonymous 
reflection of the bourgeoisie as a class. The
nation would be its class consciousness. Its
collective and indissoluble idea of a social
group (of nationals/citizens) constituted in
the State. Their will would be the general
will (although not the will of all). A will that
was perceived as “something objective,
timeless, as sacred as the truth. It is the
truth of the nation.”27 The nation, as the
natural basis for the State – not as one of
its constituent elements 28– was now the
governed by the same prevailing mechanistic 
principles.
27. Marina, J.A., Los sueños de la razón. Ensayo
sobre la experiencia política, Op. cit., p. 176.
See a Palmer, R., The Improvement of Humanity,
Education and the French Revolution, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, 1985.
28. The nation understood as an organic collectivity 
is not one of the elements that constitute the State,
but the element by which the State is constituted,
among other reasons because it is identified
with it. Understandably, therefore, the Krausists
were ideologically involved in the revolutionary
fundamental political unit, the measure 
that shaped the entire political system, 
channelled the exercise of rights, and 
ensured social loyalty. The State, writes 
Sanz del Río, “is the central sphere 
that must maintain unity and harmony 
between all organs and directions of 
human activity”29. This confidence in the 
State did not, however, attain bureaucratic 
centralism (centralisation of all social 
functions, of public matters within the 
State) characteristic of the modern State. 
Among other reasons because they were 
not statists (in the most Hegelian sense of 
the term) or, better yet, as Prof. Aranguren 
notes, because they were anti-statist30. This 
means that, in opposition to the centralist 
and bureaucratic systems31 of modern 
construction of the idea of national sovereignty. 
Indeed, Sanz del Río himself, rather reluctant to 
abandon his civil anonymity, broke his isolation 
on the occasion of the July 1854 revolution, also 
known as “Vicalvarada,” which paved the way 
for a progressive two-year period from 1854-
1856. From this moment on, his revolutionary 
involvement would remain constant until the 
revolution of 1868 and the six years of democracy 
that ensued. Cfr. D, E and Nuñez, M., “Julián Sanz 
del Río: Textos inéditos”, in Revista de Occidente, 
nº 79, 1969, and Gil Cremades, J.J, “Krausismo y 
revolución”, in krausistas y liberales, Seminarios 
y Ediciones, Madrid, 1975. 
29. DIAZ, E., “Filosofía jurídico-política del
krauso-institucionismo español”, Op. Cit., p. 49.
30. Aranguren, J.L., Moral y sociedad. Introduc-
ción a la moral social española del siglo XIX,
Madrid, Edicusa, 1966, p. 141.
31. “To understand the centralist system we must
return to the legal question as a whole, as it has been 
passed down by Justinian and Roman law, distilled 
first in Europe, then throughout the industrial
universe, on the basis of scholastic interpretations
of the Middle Ages. Centralism is first and foremost
just that: the historical-political operation that has
installed our idea of what I would gladly call the
religion of power, a religion perfectly defined in
the first title of the Code of Justinian, when the
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Europe, the Krausist-Institutionalists 
proposed a different, pluralistic and de-
centralised model of the State, which, far 
from being abstentionist, respected the 
freedom (autonomy) of each individual, 
but which in turn –as noted previously– 
made room for intermediate groups 
(societies) and national communities in 
the social design of its relationships32. 
The State is an instrument that serves 
societies. 
So with science, the idea of an individual as 
an absolute established social foundation, 
theocratic emperor defines Reason, in other words 
the Trinitarian dogma. This is essential. Centralism 
is something that sets God’s place on stage, to put 
in succinctly: setting a place on stage” Legendre, 
P., “La crisis del juridicismo” (interview and 
Spanish language version of Enrique A. Kozicki) 
in Id, et al., El discurso jurídico. Perspectiva 
psicoanalítica y otros abordajes epistemológicos, 
Buenos Aires, Hachette, 1982, p.47. 
32. Pay particular attention to the tenor of the
manifesto proclaiming the essential principles of the 
revolution of 1868. Let us not forget the ideological
influence, not to mention the implications –the little
interest shown by Sanz del Río and Giner de los
Ríos in this democratic revolution– that Krausism
exercised over the “thought that prepared this
revolution” (Aranguren, Op. Cit., p. 95). This would
explain the pre-eminent role that Krausists played in
the educational institutions of the new government.
The Manifesto states: [Thus] Spain shall be able
to move forward with a determined step, because
it will no longer be weighed down by suffocating
administrative centralisation, the cunning tool used
by corruption and tyranny to confound and drain it.
The individual, the municipality, the province and
the nation can operate independently within their
own orbit, without the distrusting intervention of
the State coercing their powers or disrupting their
manifestations as little as possible”. (Historia de
la Educación en España. Textos y Documentos,
Madrid, Ministerio de Educación, 1979, Vol. II,
p. 523). The recognition of the right of association
written into the Constitution of 1869 provided
explicit testimony of the influence this organicist
liberalism exerted over Spanish political life.
and the idea of a nation as a metaphysical 
entity (grounded in the State), all weighed 
up a new way (Krausist and Institutionalist) 
of thinking and prefiguring social relations. 
Modern Spanish society was: (A) liberal, 
constituted upon the individual person 
–future subject of law–, in other words, on
the individual (abstract and general, but
also unique in his selfhood); (b) organicist
–establishing relationships between subjects
and the various associations, social groups
and national communities– and patriarchal
(pater familiae) –which made it impossible
for women and children to reproduce socially
by relegating them to the domestic sphere33–
33. Of course it would not be fair to ignore the
concern of some Krausists for women. Fernando
de Castro, to name one. But their concern,
grounded in their firm conviction regarding
equality between men and women –in nature and
capacity, not in functions– went no further than the 
need to instruct and educate them “so that women
can respond to this ideal and always be an angel
of peace in the family, mother of the household
and a life force in human society”. Abellan, J.L.,
Op. Cit., p. 550. His Conferencias Dominicales
para la educación de la Mujer became famous.
Therefore, despite Castro’s concern for the
education of women, the truth is that in general
the prostration of women, in the new rational and
political scheme of modernity, was a fact and
evidenced the true nature of the declarations of
rights they assumed, as the foundation of political
life, the idea of equality for all human beings in
their natural rights. This is nonetheless surprising
in view of the contributions women made to the
democratisation of society (Concepción Arenal is
a good example of this historical testimony), as
well as to the revolutionary processes (Olympe de
Gouges, Madame de Staël, Rose Lacombe). (See
Duhet, P., Les Femmes et la Revolution, Gallimard,
Paris, 1971; Noack, P., Olympe de Gouges, Eds. de 
Falois, Paris, 1993; However, it would not be fair
to ignore the efforts of Fernando de Castro or the
Free Institute of Education to facilitate access for
some women to University and, therefore, to the
public and professional sphere.
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of white34 independent males, who were 
defined, first and foremost, as citizens 
and, above all, as owners.
3. On the (krausist) question
of law as a system of science
With this initial approach, we seek 
to highlight the extent to which the 
Krausist vision of the legal phenomenon 
represented, for the Spanish liberal 
bourgeoisie, the most appropriate synthesis 
between the demands of the “bourgeois 
way of being” or capitalist production, the 
processes of western modernity –always 
linked to the promise of emancipation 
through reason– and the socio-cultural 
peculiarities of the Spanish social structure, 
which was still fundamentally feudal in the 
19th Century. Clearly, we are not going to 
focus here on the importance of the law for 
Krausist intellectuals, which is a fact that 
has been widely confirmed and already 
indicated in this paper. What we are really 
striving to do is to elucidate how the law 
was the best option to embellish first and 
then accelerate social change according 
to the ideological expectations of its social 
class. This leads us to evaluate, firstly, 
the scope of the dependence assumed, 
according to Spanish Krausists, by the 
legal reflection of the instrumental ideal 
of sciences, since the law lacked its own 
epistemological status. This foreshadowed 
a conceptualising and abstract rationality, 
34. It should be said that Krausists and
Institutionalists stood out for their open repudiation 
of slavery and the socio-economic conditions of
its production. The Spanish abolitionist society,
which first appeared in 1811, was testimony
to the rejection of slavery shared by Krausist
intellectuals. The most representative exponent of
this view was Rafael María de Labra.
albeit not emancipated from metaphysics 
– the Krausists resisted taking the legal
issue away from its natural foundation.
Subsequently, we shall assess, more
broadly, the true importance acquired by
law in the design of their model of political
society.
The assimilation between science and 
power, together with the unstoppable 
progress of technology, as a hallmark 
of human superiority over the world, 
led, among other things, to law being 
considered another science. This paved 
the way for the “science of law”, which, on 
the one hand, was referred to as a “system 
of science”, insofar as it is capable of self-
producing, re-producing and repeating35 
itself according to a causal and self-
referring scheme, and, on the other, was 
identified as if its attributes were identical 
in law, morality and science. Its way of 
discovering and learning would be that 
of modern science (instrumentalism) 
with its ideals of progress, uniformity, 
control, regularity, and predictability. And 
its ideology would be rationalism as a 
philosophical expression of “rational good 
order,” in the face of the chaos of nature 
and irrational societies. Hence, the so-
35. An approach that has been pared down to the
extreme in the Kelsenian idea that the law governs
its own production. See Kelsen, H., Teoría pura
del Derecho, (translation by Roberto j. Vernengo),
Porrúa, Mexico, 1997. There have been ingenious
attempts to synthesise this idea of self-reference
and self-production of the law, even using a
computer-based simile: law would be comparable
to a cybernetic mechanism, insofar as, despite
being a mechanised system, intelligence would
have been transferred to it to operate autonomously
and to evolve in a programmed manner according
to carefully calculated schedules. See in this regard 
Trigaud., J.M., Le droit et le futur, P.U.F., Paris,
1985, p. 65 and Persona ou la justice au double
visage, Studio Editoriale di Cultura, Génova,
1990, p. 75.
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called “science of law” enters the sacred 
circle of science , a name that would please 
any self-respecting Krausist. Just look at 
the words of Sanz del Río himself: “(…) 
That is why there is a philosophy of law 
as a science in its own right, when before 
they were prolegomena, that is, logical 
preliminaries, in which some common 
concepts were gathered from here and 
there as a means of thinking judiciously 
and competently about the law, but not as 
a material and formal foundation of that 
science”36. Jiménez García argues in this 
respect: “Krause’s real contribution is to 
regard the entire universe as a superior 
scientific organism. The system of 
science comprises all knowledge, and the 
particular sciences integrate and relate to 
each other within universal science” 37
We could say that legal reflection, inserted 
in the Spanish socio-cultural configuration 
of capitalist modernity (19th-20th 
centuries), also shifted its secular search 
for systematisation towards the ideals of 
progress, control and order, regularity 
and predictability. The Krausists attached 
exceptional importance to the redemptive 
capacity of the scientific paradigm – 
which Sanz del Río himself came to define 
as “the homeland of the spirit”38. Law, like 
all other knowledge (philosophy, theology, 
grammar, etc.), could not be subtracted 
from the processes and transformations 
36. SANZ DEL RIO, J., “El derecho como ideal
fundamental en la vida. Carta inédita”, in Boletín
de la Institución de la Libre enseñanza, nº 6, 1882,
pp. 41-42. But Francisco Giner de los Ríos was
the true precursor of the legal philosophy krausist:
See “Resumen de Filosofía del Derecho” de 1898
o “Sus principios de Derecho natural” de 1873.
37. Jiménez, A., “Apuntes sobre el sistema fi-
losófico de Krause”, Op. cit., p. 203.
38. Id., Textos escogidos, Op. cit., p. 222 y en
Abellan, J.L., Op. cit., p. 475
that the scientific paradigm effected on the 
reality of things. We should be very clear, 
if we wish to avoid anachronisms, that the 
law could not be conceived (imagined) at 
that time without the paradigms in force at 
the time, that is, the scientific creed and 
the doctrine of subjective rights. 
(i) The Scientific Creed. After all, the
principle of causality had already become
the cognitive key to scientific development. 
This led Krausist authors to subscribe,
with few reservations, to a concept of law
that could be assimilated, in terms of its
mechanisms of operation, to the sciences
of nature. Hence, just as for the natural
sciences there could only ever be one
kind of reality, which had been thought
of objectively, conceived through reason
as the beginning and end of history, legal
science, true to the currency of generality
and universality, would now claim for itself
the reality of law. This obsession with
objectivity would lead legal reflection to
displace the uniqueness of contingency
and assume (functional) autonomy and
autopoiesis as a systemic framework.
(ii) On the other hand, from the 18th
century onwards, legal reflection began
to orient its developments towards natural
rights, in accordance with the theory of
subjective rights, as a requirement of
the liberal bourgeoisie, which needed to
establish its own legal-political status. This
would explain why the law is understood
as the law or rights of (bourgeois) citizens,
that is, as individual rights. But let us look,
in greater detail, as to why this was so.
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4. Social philosophy and
reformism. The importance
of law in the transformation
project of Spanish society
Given this way of understanding the 
legal phenomenon, unsurprisingly, this 
became the appropriate instrument 
to transform the structures of Spanish 
society –pre-modern and traditionalist– 
in accordance with their expectations, 
which were as enlightened as they were 
bourgeois, regarding the socio-economic 
transformation of reality. If we agree with 
Joaquín Xirau that Krausism was not a 
doctrine, but rather a decisive instrument 
in the restoration of Spain39, it is not 
difficult to imagine that the law was seen, 
by the liberal programme of the Spanish 
progressive bourgeoisie, as an experience 
of possibility around what until then had 
been impossible: that this class might 
take power - indeed the words power and 
possibility have the same etymological 
root posse -. The law now operated as 
a kind of utopian regulation of society, 
with the capacity to legally constitute 
its model of liberal society, through the 
creation (imagination) of its own law. This 
conception of the legal, which identified 
law and science and moved away from 
contingency, was used by the other 
process that was being imposed in Spain 
at the time: Capitalism.
After so much enlightenment, jus 
commune, as a single body of laws, was 
insufficient for their ideals of emancipation 
as a social class. It did not meet their 
expectations regarding the necessary 
juridification of economic processes, 
39. Xirau, J., “Sanz del Río y el movimiento
krausista”, Op. cit., pp. 21 et sequens.
although it had always responded, 
through its attempts at systematisation 
and legal rationalisation, to strengthening 
their situation in a social model it did 
not yet control. Now they needed to 
create their own legal society. In this way, 
they ensured not only the creation of 
institutions and mechanisms to ensure 
their political and economic dominance, 
but also successfully justified the need to 
adapt to the international emergence of 
trade and the industrial revolution, that is, 
the progress of the economy. 
As a result, legal experience became 
decisive, the test bank that modernity and 
its reality-shaping expectations needed. 
The law assumed, on the one hand, the 
role, invaluable to political liberalism, of 
designing social life, in accordance with the 
theses of contractualism and the political 
economy, as normative conceptions of the 
world. Capitalist society was thus outlined. 
And, on the other hand, it was attributed 
the function of legitimising the power of 
the State, this time as a reflection of the 
sovereign will40, within a paradigmatic 
transition that synthesised modernity with 
capitalism and science with law. 
The keen perception of the Spanish 
Krausist philosophers was to intuit that 
law could provide the decisive instrument 
for achieving power. Hence their radical 
Juridicism. After all, modern law has 
simply tried to support legally, with 
its categorical constructions –private 
autonomy and economic constitution 
(Civil Code)– the transformations that the 
40. See Legendre, P., El amor del censor. Ensayo
sobre el orden dogmático (original title L´amour
du censeur. Essai sur l´ordre dogmatique, Edi-
tions du Seuil, Paris, 1974, trad. de Marta Gia-
comino), Anagrama, Barcelona, 1979, especially
the pages 218-220.
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capitalist system required as a historical 
process.
Therefore, however angelic the convic-
tions and references of the Krausist 
philosophers to the legal phenomenon 
may have been –from Sanz del Río, to 
Azcarate or Giner de los Ríos– (“the law of 
the World or as the State of God on earth”, 
“Basic value of the idea of solidarity among 
all men”, “the order of good, free and 
necessary conduct for the fulfilment of the 
purposes of life” , etc.), and however they 
might have viewed the law as the best 
option to shape “good [social] order”,41 to 
lead men toward new levels of peace and 
universal coexistence (aequitas civilis), 
that is, as a source of freedom or vehicle 
for emancipation, we should not be fooled 
into believing that emancipation (reason) 
triumphed in modern law, rather than 
regulation (authority). 
Modern law was entrusted with the task of 
enabling social order through regulation. 
However, it did not pursue “rational 
good order”, as a solution provided by 
intelligence (thinking substance) to 
41. Expressions not as illustrative as the following: 
“It is not mere scientific interest that should lead
us to this Holy and beautiful idea of law” but a
feeling of love and gratitude, a rational worship,
as much as can be seen in this idea as the Law
of the World or as the State of God on earth
(….)”. Sanz del Río, J., “El derecho como ideal 
fundamental en la vida. Carta inédita”, in Boletín 
de la Institución de la Libre enseñanza, nº 6, 1882, 
p. 41. Let us also not forget the words of Giner
de los Ríos himself when he refers to law as “the
body of conditions which, depending on the free
activity of each rational being, are necessary for
the rational propose of all”. Diaz, E., Filosofía
jurídico-política del krauso-institucionismo es-
pañol”, Op. Cit., p. 29; Landau, P., “La Filosofía
del Derecho de K.C.F. Krause”, in Reivindicación
de Krause, Fundación Friedrich Ebert, Madrid,
1982, p. 74.
the problems of the world, but rather 
“bourgeois good order”, in the form of 
the ideological-political aspirations of 
capitalism. This vision of modern law is 
attributed the function of regulating social 
order; hence, its emancipatory potential 
is delegitimised. Only in doing so does 
it establish order, since it enshrines the 
vision of things encompassed by that order, 
which is now a vision of the bourgeoisie 
as a thriving socio-economic order in 
Spain. Thus, the law becomes the docile 
instrument of institutional construction 
needed by Spanish bourgeois society at 
the end of the 19th century. 
In other words, there was no better 
way –than through law– to regulate and 
schedule changes, to crystallise, in a new 
bespoke order, the social and political 
project that this new social class had 
needed practically since the mid-18th 
century. Was there a better way to natu-
ralise the historical process, to reduce 
social progress to the development of 
the foundations of capitalism so recently 
introduced in Spain? Was there a better 
way to conceal, under the guise of 
revolutions and innovations, what was 
simply a question of taking power? In 
the transition to modernity, beneath the 
trappings of revolution, declarations and 
socio-cultural change, many things had 
not in fact altered. The same struggle was 
still ever present: the struggle to achieve 
power. And, once power had been taken, 
it was a case of wielding it by proscribing 
emancipation. A dogmatic conception 
of power still held sway. The contents 
(materials) had been attacked but the 
formalities remained unquestioned. Now 
it was the nation, as a reflection of the 
bourgeoisie as an emerging social group, 
that assumed the prerogatives of the king, 
just as the king had once taken them from 
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the Supreme Pontiff42. The sequence of 
absolutisation of power had remained 
immutable (dogmatic), “like a reef”43. The 
historical scenario was now different but, 
although everything seemed to change, 
there was something that remained intact: 
the way in which power was understood, 
the place from which authority was exer-
cised, and, of course, relations of power 
and domination (there were still subjects 
of domination)
Law, with its official status (backed by 
power), with its technical capacity (thanks 
to its cognitive-instrumental rationality that 
it had taken from the sciences) and its 
creative potential (power of nomination) 
could effectively delineate and/or re-
compose the complex design –of ins-
titutions and rights– that the new model 
of society needed. For Krausist authors, 
law was always a decisive instrument in 
their proposals for the reform of Spanish 
society, that is, in the tasks of moral design 
and execution of “the lawful purposes of 
society”44. But it could also consecrate, as 
indeed it did, the socio-economic dictates 
required by the new pre-eminent position 
of the Spanish liberal bourgeoisie. There 
was no better way to legitimise the re-
configuration of power, both political (the 
state) and economic, more thorough and 
less mystical in this latter case. 
42. Kantorowicz, E., “Mysteries of State: An Ab-
solutist Concept and his Late Medieval Origins”,
en Harvard Theological Review, 48, 1955, p. 88;
in MARINA., J.A., Los sueños de la razón. En-
sayo sobre la experiencia política, Op. cit., pp.
92 y 259.
43. Ibid. p. 93.
44. Diaz, E., “La filosofía Jurídico-política del
krauso-institucionismo español”, Op. Cit., p. 54.
5. Conclusions
The purpose of this article is to show that, 
for Spanish Krausism, with its profound 
confidence in the moral solidarity of man 
and despite the egalitarian-democratic 
design of Enlightened modernity that 
represented –although also functional to 
the logic that owns the socio-economic 
order to which they belonged–, the law 
was not a far cry from the perception of 
its Western bourgeois contemporaries, 
who understood the legal sphere as the 
best option to manage the inevitable 
social change of irrational (pre-modern) 
societies, in accordance with their expec-
tations surrounding the socio-economic 
transformation of reality.
We are not seeking to downplay the role 
of Krausist philosophy in the construction 
– as Elías Díaz concludes – “of the best of
our intellectual, political and social life.”
Among other reasons, because we think
that Krausist philosophy holds a privileged
place in the historical contemporary
cultural shaping of our country: (i) it
was decisive in the convergence - albeit
somewhat late - in Spain of the processes
of European Enlightenment, linked to the
principles of secularisation (the polytheism 
of values, tolerance, religious freedom, as
expressions of a liberal Christianity that is
deeply rooted in all kinds of dogmatisms)
and democracy (the principle of equality,
participation, social pluralism, plurality of
voices and reasons, etc.); (ii) its influence
on Spanish political activity was, therefore,
crucial, at least from the six-year period of
democracy and up to the second republic;
and (iii) its innumerable contributions to
the field of education were weaving new
channels and scenarios of democracy for
Spanish society –which would crystallise in 
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the Constitution of 1931– through bodies 
such as the Free Institute of Education and 
the Council for the Expansion of Studies. 
Its open and generous confidence in the 
transformative capacity of education, 
understood as a decisive factor of change, 
implied a powerful educational proposal 
for the socio-historical transformation of 
our democratic culture45. 
Suffice it to say, it was a whole pedagogy 
for democracy and responsibility. 
Education and responsibility –the latter 
as a priority objective of liberal education– 
became the crux of the model of political 
society proposed by Krausist philosophy. 
These notions were the force behind their 
social and political reforms of Spanish 
society. Their education model was one of 
comprehensive education that surpassed 
its traditional role guiding the preparation 
(instruction) of citizens for their professional 
future or for the system of social functions. 
The aim was, in the words of Giner de 
los Ríos, to awaken an “adult people,” a 
people where citizens would be able to 
live and commit themselves as free and 
responsible citizens. From this perspective, 
the ultimate aim of the education system 
proposed by Krausism-Institutionalism 
responded, on the one hand, to people’s 
life journey and the most appropriate 
means, and, on the other, to the excellence 
of students, thus enabling the discovery 
of people capable of independent and 
deliberative thought, able to lead and 
actively participate in strengthening the 
democratic principle. Democracy, for 
Krausist authors, necessarily involved 
education. They both interact with one 
45. V. also a Llopis, R., “Francisco Giner de los 
Ríos y la reforma del hombre”, in Cuadernos del 
Congreso de la libertad para la cultura, Paris, nº 
16, 1956, p. 63). Education is, as Lacroix would 
one day say, “the core of our civilisation.”
another. Without reforming the heart of 
men, without educating them, integral 
reform of the values and structures of 
Spanish society would not be possible. 
Indeed, says Giner de los Ríos, “Spain’s 
problem is, above all, a problem of 
education.” As Prof. Abellán argues, it was 
“a revolution in Spain’s traditional scale of 
values, which would bring about profound 
changes in education and customs. In a 
way, Krausism represents, in a similar 
perspective, the genuine incorporation 
of the Enlightenment’s ideological as-
sumptions into our cultural and social 
landscape.”46 
However, as far as the law is concerned, 
we must say that it failed to avoid the 
shortcomings of social knowledge su-
rrounding modern Spanish legal science, 
which would eventually drift –enticed by 
the liberal bourgeoisie, who needed to 
establish their own legal-political status– 
toward the unstoppable absolutisation 
of their (dogmatic) categories and of the 
legal formalisation of rights, which were 
beginning to be considered exclusively 
as the rights of individuals, of citizens 
(bourgeois), that is, as individual rights. 
In other words, in the context of Spanish 
modernity, modern law (scientific, 
positive, regulatory, but also historical 
and conventional) as a legitimiser of State 
law, began to operate on the side (at the 
service) of regulation and the ideological 
aspirations and interests of a specific 
order47, of a minority social class that 
46. Abellan, J.L., Op. cit., p. 476. 
47. In relation to capitalism as an order: Gr-
araudy, R., La Alternativa (título original 
L´Alternative, Robert Laffont, París, 1972, trad. 
de José Ma. De Llanos y Gregorio Peces-Barba), 
Madrid, EDICUSA, 1973, pp. 63-64. Sobre el 
desarrollo y contenidos del capitalismo, véanse: 
Polany, Karl (1997), La gran transformación. 
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had, nonetheless, begun to dominate: 
the liberal bourgeoisie. However, our 
intention is not to reproach those who 
maintained Krausism in Spain for having 
promoted the regulatory dimension of 
law. Especially because it does not seem 
possible for the law cast off its regulatory 
endeavours (its coercive nature could 
be, as most doctrine has pointed out, a 
hallmark). Rather, what we regret here 
is that, despite the centrality of the legal 
issue in the Krausist system, they failed 
to unlock its emancipatory dimension 
(utopian side), represented here by the 
Krausist ideas of that “holy and beautiful 
idea of law.”48 
Crítica del liberalismo económico (título original 
The Great Transformation, trad. de Julia Varela 
y Fernando Álvarez-Uría), Madrid, La Piqueta, 
1997, 466 pp. 
48. Sanz del Rio, J., “El derecho como ideal fun-
damental en la vida”, Op. cit., p. 41, note 32.

